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RECENT DECISIONS
court categorically to answer any question propounded by a jury
constitutes error." 20
In the La Marca case, the Court distinguished the Gonzalez and
Gezzo cases on their facts 21 and quoted from the Cooke majority
opinion.2 2 The psychiatrist for the defense had testified to the effect
that defendant did not know his act was wrong until the day follow-
ing its commission. Since, however, kidnapping is a continuing crime,
the jury could find that defendant had persisted in the act after realiz-
ing its wrongful nature and had therefore become criminally respon-
sible. The jury's question-"If one should belive [sic] that the
defendent [sic] was insane part of the time during the commission
of the crime must we find in favor of the defendent [sic]" 2 3-- could
only be answered in the negative. Thus, reasoned the Court, no
harmful inference could have been drawn by the jury: if a negative
answer were assumed, that would have been correct; if positive, that
would have incorrectly benefited the defendant. A clear rule thus
emerges, distinct from any consideration of Section 427; only an
implication arising from a judge's refusal to respond that is preju-
dicial to defendant's rights will require reversal.
The interpretation advanced by the dissent in the instant case
places the emphasis upon the clause in Section 427, ". . . information
required must be given . . ." 24 which it has taken out of context.
This approach might unduly burden trial judges when confronted
with irrelevancies from inexperienced jurors.
The Court has, in effect, applied the essence of Section 542 of
the Code of Criminal Procedure: "After hearing the appeal, the
court must give judgment, without regard to technical errors or de-
fects or to exceptions which do not affect the substantial rights of
the parties." 25 The result of the La Marca decision is to leave re-
sponse to jury questions in the court's discretion.
X
FDERAL JURISDICTIoN-STocKHOLDER'S DERIVATIVE AcTIoN-
HELD ANTAGONISM EXISTS WHEN MANAGEMENT IS ALIGNED
20 People v. Gezzo, 307 N.Y. 385, 396, 121 N.E.2d 380, 385 (1954), para-
phrasing People v. Cooke, 292 N.Y. 185, 188, 54 N.E2d 357, 359 (1944).2 1 People v. La Marca, 3 N.Y2d 452, 462, 144 N.E.2d 420, 426 (1957).
22 Id. at 461, 144 N.E.2d at 425. The Cooke majority opinion was written by
judge Desmond, who dissented in the instant case quoting the Cooke dissent.
23 Ibid.
24 Id. at 466-67, 144 N.E.2d at 429.25 N.Y. CoDE CRIM. PRoc. § 542. The court tacitly avoided the caveat of the
Cooke dissent which said "no appellate court may disregard the error under sec-
tion 542 of the Code of Criminal Procedure." People v. Cooke, 292 N.Y. 185,
193, 54 N.E2d 357, 361 (1944).
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AGAINST STOCKHoLDER.-Plaintiff brought a stockholder's derivative
suit, alleging fraudulent waste of assets of Warner Bros. Pictures
Inc. that benefited United States Pictures Inc. Both are Delaware
corporations. The District Court, finding no basis of antagonism,
realigned the stockholder's corporation as plaintiff and dismissed the
action for lack of diversity of citizenship. In reversing, the Supreme
Court held that there is antagonism whenever the management is
aligned against the stockholder and defends a course of conduct
which he attacks. Antagonism can be determined on the face of the
pleadings and by the nature of the controversy. Smith v. Sperling,
354 U.S. 91 (1957).
The United States Constitution 1 confers upon the Supreme
Court and such inferior courts as Congress may establish, jurisdic-
tion of suits involving diversity of citizenship. The Judiciary Act of
1789 2 established diversity jurisdiction in the lower federal courts
and, through succeeding acts, 3 the extent of this jurisdiction was
defined. 4 To sustain it, all the parties on one side of the controversy
must be citizens of states different from the states of all the parties
on the other side.5
In the area of stockholder's derivative suits, the courts have
developed the principle'of antagonism in order to bring these suits
within the federal diversity jurisdiction. The cause of action in these
suits properly belongs to the corporation 6 but the stockholder is
forced to bring it because of the failure or inability of the corporation
to act. His action is based upon an injury done to the corporation,
not upon a personal wrong.7 However, if the court aligned the
parties according to their apparent interests in the dispute, the cor-
poration would be on the same side of the controversy as the stock-
holder,8 even though it had participated in the actions of which he
complains. Should the defendant corporation, as in the instant case,
1 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
228 U.S.C. §41(1)(b) (1952).
328 U.S.C. §§71, 72 (1952); 28 U.S.C. § 41(1) (1952); 28 U.S.C. § 1332
(1952).
- See Frank, Historical Basis of the Federal Judicial System, 13 LAW &
CoNTEmP. PRoB. 3, 28 (1948). "To summarize, the diversity jurisdiction . . .
may fairly be said 'to be the product of three factors....
1) The desire to avoid regional prejudice against commercial litigants ....
2) The desire to permit commercial, manufacturing, and speculative in-
terests to litigate their controversies . . . before judges who would be
firmly tied to their own interests.
3) The desire to achieve more efficient administration of justice for the
classes thus benefited." Ibid.
5 Strawbridge v. Curtiss, 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 267 (1806).
6 See Price v. Gurney, 324 U.S. 100 (1945).
7 For a brief history of the development of the stockholder's derivative
suit, see Prunty, The Shareholder's Derivative Suit: Notes on Its Derivation,
32 N.Y.U.L. REv. 980 (1957).
s See Koster v. Lumberman's Mut. Co., 330 U.S. 518 (1946).
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be incorporated in the same state as the plaintiff's corporation,9 the
necessary diversity of citizenship would be lost since Delaware cor-
porations would be on both sides of the controversy.
The requirements for antagonism were first brought out in the
case of Dodge v. Woolsey.'0 The Court there held that a corporate
bank and its directors were properly aligned as defendants since their
actions in refusing to contest an unconstitutional tax upon the bank
amounted to a breach of trust toward the suing stockholder.
Antagonism was further defined by the case of Doctor v. Harrington,"
which stated that in order to prevent realignment of the corporation
as plaintiff, ". . . the stockholder's interests and the interests of the
corporation must be ... subservient to some illegal purpose .. " 12
of the officers and directors. Thus the use of the principle of antag-
onism to support diversity jurisdiction has been ". . . cast normally
in terms of some fraud, illegality or breach of trust" 13 in the acts
of the corporate management which dominated the corporation. The
District Court in the instant case, discovering no illegality by manage-
ment, held that no collision of interest existed between plaintiff and
his corporation and refused to find the necessary antagonism.'
4
Criticism 15 of the increased number of stockholder suits brought
as a result of the Dodge v. Woolsey case caused the adoption of
Equity Rule 94.16 Rule 94, which is now Rule 23 (b) of the Fed-
eral Rules of Civil Procedure, requires a showing by the suing stock-
holder of his efforts to stimulate management action or the reasons
for not making such efforts, and is designed to prevent collusion"
between management and stockholders in order to satisfy diversity
jurisdiction requirements.
9 For the purpose of suing and being sued in the courts of the United
States, a corporation created by and doing business in a state is to be considered
a citizen of the state, and it is conclusively presumed by law that the stock-
holders of the corporation are citizens of the same state as the corporation.
Barrow S.S. Co. v. Kane, 170 U.S. 100 (1898). However, the Court will in
addition recognize that the plaintiff stockholders are citizens of a different
state in prosecuting a derivative action on behalf of the corporation. Doctor
v. Harrington, 196 U.S. 579 (1905).
1059 U.S. (18 How.) 331 (1855).
11 196 U.S. 579 (1905).
12 Doctor v. Harrington, 196 U.S. 579, 587 (1905).
13 Smith v. Sperling, 354 U.S. 91, 95 (1957).
14 Smith v. Sperling, 117 F. Supp. 781, 804-05 (1953).15 Hawes v. Oakland, 104 U.S. 450, 452 (1881). "In certain cases where a
corporation wished to litigate a case in the federal courts, if the suit was
brought by the corporation there would have been no jurisdiction on the ground
of diversity of citizenship. It became a practice in order to get such cases
into the federal courts, to arrange either to have a non-resident shareholder
sue the cororation . . . or have shares transferred to a non-resident who
would, upon formal refusal of the board of directors to act, bring a derivative
suit in the federal courts." BALLANTINE, CoaPoroToNs 357 (rev. ed. 1946).
26 Rule 94 was later followed as Equity Rule 27 and is now embodied in
Rule 23(b).
'17 See Hawes v. Oakland, note 15 supra.
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The instant case may increase the scope of federal diversity
jurisdiction in the area of stockholder's derivative suits 18 and re-
lax the traditional concept of antagonism. To bring the case in a
federal court, the stockholder need no longer charge fraud or illegality
but only has to show an honest collision of interest with the corporate
management. The court will "determine the issue of antagonism
on the face of the pleadings and by the nature of the controversy." 19
It seems that the issue of whether there was collusion was the sole
factor that prompted the courts to go into the question of realign-
ment. 20  There was no claim of collusion in the Sperling case.
In overturning the requirements which the District Court de-
clared necessary to establish antagonism, the Court was motivated by
a belief that the problems raised by the old rule did not properly
belong to the preliminary issue of jurisdiction. 21 "To stop and try
the charge of wrongdoing" 22 by management is to decide an issue
which belongs to the merits, the Court said. The lower court deter-
mined after a fifteen-day hearing that there was no evidence of
wrongdoing by management. It thus went into the merits of the case
to determine jurisdiction, a practice which the Supreme Court finds
improper.
The validity of retaining the privilege of diversity jurisdiction
has been questioned. 23  It is contended that sectional prejudice is at
an end and businessmen no longer need to fear local courts.2 4 Advo-
cates of this view see diversity jurisdiction as an invasion of the
jurisdiction of state courts.2 5
The opposing view believes that diversity jurisdiction has con-
tributed greatly to the commercial development and unity of the
is Smith v. Sperling, 354 U.S. 91, 105 (1957) (dissenting opinion).
19 Id. at 96.
20 Koster v. Lumberman's Mut Co., 330 U.S. 518 (1946) ; Chicago v. Mills,
204 U.S. 321 (1907); Dawson v. Columbia Trust Co., 197 U.S. 178 (1905).
21354 U.S. at 95 (1957).
22 Ibid.
23 See HART & WECHSLER, THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM
894 (1953) ; Frankfurter, Distribution of Judicial Power Between United States
and State Courts, 3 CORNE.L L.Q. 499, 521 (1928).
"In many ways the worst part of diversity jurisdiction is that it debases
the judicial process, reducing federal judges to what Judge Frank has called
'ventriloquist's dummy to the courts of some particular state'-because they
lack the requisite authority to speak themselves." HART & WECHSLER, op. cit.
mnpra at 895.
24 See HART & WECHSLER, op. cit. supra note 23, at 897; Frankfurter,
note 23 supra.
25 See McGovney, A Supreme Court Fiction 1, 56 HARv. L. REv. 853, 860
(1943).
". .. [N]ational courts have invaded the autonomy thus reserved to the
states in an important class of cases. . . . [T]he administration of state law
in cases in which a state-created corporation is a party is usurped by the
national courts. . . ." Ibid.
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United States,26 and in today's expanded and complex business world,
it retains its importance.2 7 The decision in the instant case would
appear to place the Supreme Court in accord with this view.
Despite the possibility, pointed out by the dissent,28 of an in-
creased number of stockholder suits burdening the federal courts, s2
the Supreme Court is strengthening the guarantee of an impartial
forum wherein stockholder suits may be used to enforce corporate
responsibility ". . . without destroying the right of a majority of
the members of a corporate body to govern the affairs of that body." 30
X
INTERNATIONAL LAW - CONSTITUTIONAL LAW - TREATIES -
ExERcISE OF WAIVER PROVISION IN JAPANESE PROTOCOL HELD
CONSTITUTIONAL.-On a petition for a writ of habeas corpus and
other relief, the District Court for the District of Columbia ' enjoined
the United States authorities from delivering an American soldier to
the Japanese Government for trial in the killing of a Japanese citizen.
21 See Parker, The Federal Jurisdiction and Recent Attacks Upon It,
18 A.B.A.J. 433, 437 (1932). Judge Parker says of diversity jurisdiction:
"No power exercised under the Constitution has . . . had greater influence
in welding these United States into a single nation; nothing has done more to
foster interstate commerce and communication and uninterrupted flow of
capital for investment into the various parts of the Union; and nothing has
been so potent in sustaining the public credit and the sanctity of private
contracts." Ibid.
27 See JUDIcIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, ANNUAL REPORT OF
THE DREcTOR OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS 81
(1955).
23 The dissent declares: "Refusal to sue provides automatic entry." Smith
v. Sperling, 354 U.S. 91, 105 (1957) (dissenting opinion).
29 See Frankfurter, Distribution of Judicial Power Between United States
and State Courts, 13 CORNELL L.Q. 499 (1928). For a statistical survey of the
amount of diversity of citizenship litigation in the federal courts, see JUDicrAL
CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR OF THE
ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS 94 (1955).30 Prunty, The Shareholder's Derivative Sudt: Notes on Its Derivation,
32 N.Y.U.L. REV. 980, 993 (1957).
' Girard v. Wilson, 152 F. Supp. 21 (D.D.C. 1957). The respondent
Girard, while guarding a machine gun during a small unit exercise at Camp
Weir range area in Japan, had shot and killed a Japanese woman who was
gathering expended cartridge cases in the area. The United States claimed the
right to try Girard upon the ground that his act, as certified by his command-
ing officer, was "done in the performance of official duty'." Japan contended
that his act was not in the line of duty and that therefore Japan had the
right to try him. The matter was considered by a Joint Committee which was
unable to agree. Thereafter, the United States authorities notified Japan that
Girard would be turned over to them for trial. It was at this point that Girard
petitioned the district court.
